The governance of nitrogen fertiliser markets in the European Union has long been shaped by a fundamental and persistent tension between the competing interests of farmers and domestic fertiliser producers. On one side, European farmers advocate for unfettered access to nitrogenous fertilisers at the lowest possible prices—inputs that are critical to their productivity and competitiveness. On the other side, EU-based fertiliser manufacturers have lobbied for trade protection to shield themselves from what they view as unfair competition—particularly low-cost imports of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers often linked to price dumping or state subsidies in exporting countries.
This traditional conflict has become significantly more complex in recent years, as new forces reshape the political economy of fertiliser trade. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 dramatically altered global energy markets, sending natural gas prices—the main feedstock for synthetic nitrogen fertilisers—soaring across Europe. This not only undermined the cost competitiveness of EU fertiliser producers but also exposed vulnerabilities in the Union’s supply chains, especially its reliance on imports from geopolitically sensitive suppliers such as Russia (see my previous post detailing trends in import sourcing of nitrogenous fertilisers to the EU).
In response to geopolitical imperatives, the Commission has now proposed a new wave of import restrictions and tariffs on Russian and Belarusian fertilisers in 2025 (COM(2025) 34). While aimed at reducing strategic dependencies and curbing revenues that could support military aggression, these measures have reignited protests from the farming community, who fear rising input prices and shrinking margins.
Compounding these pressures is the European Union’s climate policy agenda. The full implementation of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from 1 January next year will impose an obligation on importers of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers to purchase certificates corresponding to the carbon emissions embedded in the products they are importing. While intended to ensure a level playing field in the fertiliser market and to reduce carbon leakage, the policy is likely to increase costs for import-dependent sectors—including farming—sparking concerns among farmers that they will bear the brunt of these environmental measures.
Overlaying these economic and geopolitical tensions is the growing recognition of the environmental costs associated with conventional fertiliser use. The production of nitrogen fertilisers is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, making it a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the application of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers on farmland leads to the release of nitrous oxide—a greenhouse gas nearly 300 times more potent than carbon dioxide in terms of global warming potential. These climate-related concerns add yet another layer of complexity to fertiliser governance.
In addition to its climate impacts, the widespread use of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers (as well as organic manure) contributes to significant environmental degradation through nitrate leaching into groundwater and surface water, leading to eutrophication, biodiversity loss, and threats to drinking water quality (EEA, 2022). The disruption of the natural nitrogen cycle has been identified as one of the key planetary boundaries being transgressed in Europe, with serious implications for ecosystem health and long-term agricultural sustainability (de Vries et al., 2022).
As the EU seeks to align its agricultural, trade, and climate goals, the fertiliser market has become a highly contested space—caught at the intersection of agricultural competitiveness, industrial policy, and environmental ambition. The EU faces the dual challenge of decarbonising fertiliser production—potentially through green ammonia technologies—and reducing farmers’ reliance on chemical nitrogen inputs altogether, through improved nutrient efficiency, agroecological practices, or increased use of organic sources.
This post explores these policy dilemmas at the heart of EU fertiliser policy and examines how the transition can be managed in a way that maintains food production, ensures fair treatment of farmers, and preserves the viability of domestic industry.
The Evolution of EU Trade Policy on Fertilisers
Trade policy has played a central role in shaping the European Union’s fertiliser market, particularly in balancing the interests of farmers seeking affordable inputs with the concerns of domestic manufacturers facing intense international competition. Over the past decade, the EU has deployed a combination of import tariffs and anti-dumping duties to manage this tension—especially in relation to imports from Russia, Belarus, and major exporters like the United States and Trinidad and Tobago.
The standard tariff rate on imports of ammonia (HS code 2814) is 5.5% and on imports of nitrogenous fertilisers (HS code 3102) is 6.5%. Imports from certain exporters, such as Egypt, Algeria and Trinidad and Tobago, enter duty-free under free trade agreements.
The EU’s earliest anti-dumping duties on nitrogen fertilisers date back to the 1980s, but a more focused policy era began in the 2010s. In 2013, the Commission initiated a review of existing anti-dumping duties on ammonium nitrate from Russia, leading to their continuation in 2014. The decision reflected concerns that low-cost Russian imports were undercutting EU manufacturers, despite objections from farm groups about higher input costs. Following an expiry review, these anti-dumping duties were extended by the Commission in 2020 for five years at the same duty rate of €32.71 per tonne.
In 2018, the EU widened its scope with a new anti-dumping investigation targeting urea ammonium nitrate (UAN) solutions from Russia, the United States, and Trinidad and Tobago, prompted by a complaint from Fertilizers Europe. Provisional duties were introduced in 2019, followed by definitive duties in October 2019, with rates of up to 42% on Russian producers and similar measures for the U.S. and Trinidadian exporters.
The onset of the Ukraine war in 2022 brought a sharp rise in fertiliser and gas prices. In response, the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2465, suspending tariffs on urea and ammonia imports from most trading partners for six months—from December 2022 to June 2023. This suspension explicitly excluded imports from Russia and Belarus, reflecting the geopolitical backdrop. However, the anti-dumping duties on ammonium nitrate and UAN remained in place, and a proposal to suspend them—under pressure from farming organisations—was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that it would unfairly harm the EU industry.
In a dramatic turn, the European General Court annulled the 2020 extension of anti-dumping duties on Russian ammonium nitrate in July 2023, citing procedural flaws. However, the decision did not retroactively remove earlier duties or affect the separate duties on UAN, which remained in force under Regulation (EU) 2019/1688.
The European Union did not impose direct sanctions on fertiliser imports from Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, although there may have been indirect impacts on trade flows. Several major Russian fertiliser producers, including EuroChem and Uralchem, though not themselves sanctioned, were linked to sanctioned individuals. Moreover, broader EU and US sanctions affecting the Russian banking system and international payments infrastructure created uncertainty and impeded transactions, even for non-sanctioned goods like fertilisers.
On the Russian side, the government implemented temporary export quotas and, at various points, export taxes to stabilize domestic supply and prices. For instance, in November 2022, Russia introduced a new export tax on fertiliser exports, effective from January 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023. Additionally, Russia set its fertiliser export quota at 11.8 million tonnes for the period January-May 2023 to ensure sufficient domestic supply. These measures, while not explicitly targeted at the EU, contributed to tightening global fertiliser supply and price volatility. The combination of informal trade frictions, payment constraints, and Russian administrative controls can have had a chilling effect on fertiliser flows, despite the formal absence of EU-level import bans on such products.
Nonetheless, despite these various measures, EU imports of Russian urea have continued to rise. Crucially, urea which is the most important nitrogenous fertiliser import has not been subject to anti-dumping duties. While the MFN tariff of 6.5% applies, the lack of sanctions or quotas means that Russian urea has remained both legal and competitively priced. By 2024, Russia has become the second-largest supplier of urea to the EU, after Egypt—an outcome that fuelled mounting concerns about strategic dependency.
This policy evolution reveals the EU’s uneasy balancing act: offering protection to its fertiliser industry while preserving affordability for farmers, all under the shadow of shifting geopolitical risk. The Commission’s proposed 2025 tariff reforms represent an attempt to recalibrate this trade-off in a more explicitly strategic and climate-aligned direction.
CBAM and the Future of Carbon Pricing in Fertiliser Trade
While tariffs and anti-dumping duties have historically shaped the European fertiliser market, the European Union is now entering a new era of trade governance increasingly defined by climate policy. Central to this transformation is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU’s flagship instrument to align international trade with its climate goals. CBAM is designed to level the playing field between domestic producers—who are subject to EU carbon pricing—and foreign suppliers whose emissions are unregulated or priced at lower levels. Fertilisers and ammonia were among the sectors added to CBAM during the final legislative negotiations in 2022, a recognition of their significant emissions intensity and trade exposure.
Under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), domestic fertiliser manufacturers have until now benefitted from free allowances to prevent carbon leakage—that is, the risk of relocating production to jurisdictions with laxer climate rules. These free allowances have largely shielded EU producers from the full cost of carbon, despite the high emissions intensity of fertiliser production, especially ammonia.
CBAM will gradually replace these free allowances. During the transitional phase (2023–2025), importers are required to report embedded emissions in their products, but no financial charge is applied. Starting in 2026, importers will be required to purchase CBAM certificates based on the embedded emissions of the imported fertilisers and the prevailing EU carbon price (under the ETS). The value of these certificates will reflect:
- The actual embedded emissions in the product (if verified), or default values set by the Commission.
- The extent to which a carbon price was already paid in the country of origin (to avoid double-charging).
This mechanism is designed to ensure that imported fertilisers bear an equivalent carbon cost to those produced in the EU, especially as domestic producers lose their free allowances over the course of 2026–2034. An important issue is the extent of the likely pass-through of the cost of the additional ETS allowances and the CBAM levy into the EU domestic fertiliser price for nitrogenous fertilisers.
The general assumption that the pass-through rate will be 100% (i.e., that domestic fertiliser prices will increase in lock-step with the levy rate) may not be valid. There is some evidence (CE Delft 2016) that fertiliser companies were able to pass-through the opportunity cost of the free allowances they have received in the past in product prices, thus generating windfall profits, although a study by Copenhagen Economics (2015) commissioned by Fertilizers Europe disputed this. Thus some of the additional cost of ETS allowances may already be reflected in higher product prices on the EU market. The companies argue that their current profitability is low so the scope to absorb the cost of additional ETS allowances and the levy costs is also low. Ultimately, the pass-through rate of the CBAM levy and the withdrawal of free allowances into domestic fertiliser prices will depend on a complex interplay of factors, including import reliance, producer margins, and market competition.
The inclusion of fertilisers and ammonia in CBAM introduces a new and potentially destabilising force into EU fertiliser governance. On one hand, it addresses long-standing concerns of unfair competition by holding foreign suppliers accountable for their carbon footprints. This is particularly relevant given that key exporters like Russia, Algeria, and Egypt have little to no carbon pricing in place, giving them a structural cost advantage.
On the other hand, CBAM will raise the price of imported nitrogen-based fertilisers. Farmers are understandably concerned that the mechanism will exacerbate already high input costs, especially in the absence of robust compensation or transition support measures. At the same time, EU fertiliser producers are lobbying for stronger border protections—including both CBAM and traditional tariffs—to create the certainty and investment capacity needed to shift toward green ammonia and low-carbon production processes.
CBAM thus sits at the heart of a broader governance transformation, forcing the EU to reconcile its climate ambitions with economic competitiveness and food system resilience. These dynamics converge in the Commission’s 2025 proposal to increase tariffs on imports from Russia and Belarus—an initiative as much about strategic autonomy and security as it is about climate alignment.
The 2025 Tariff Proposal and the Politics of Protection
In January 2025, the European Commission unveiled a proposal to impose new and significantly higher tariffs on nitrogen fertiliser imports from Russia and Belarus at a level intended to halt their import into the EU. The proposal targets urea and ammonium nitrate—two of the most widely used nitrogenous fertilisers—many of which have been entering the EU at low cost from Russia, even in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. Although these imports are not formally sanctioned, they have become politically toxic, particularly as evidence mounted that Russian fertiliser and ammonia exports to the EU surged in 2023 and 2024, delivering €2.2 billion in revenue in 2024.
The Commission’s proposed measures, which only cover the two principal nitrogenous fertilisers and not ammonia or other fertilisers, involve tariffs starting at 13% in 2025 and increasing to 100% over a three-year phase-in period, intended to allow domestic producers and traders time to adapt (the higher tariffs can be introduced more quickly during this transition period if imports exceed certain specified volumes). The rationale is threefold:
- Strategic autonomy: To reduce dependence on Russian fertiliser, a critical input in EU agriculture.
- Revenue disruption: To limit export earnings that could be used to support military aggression.
- Industrial policy: To bolster EU fertiliser manufacturers during a critical phase of decarbonisation and regulatory transition under the CBAM.
The proposal immediately exposed the enduring fault lines within EU fertiliser governance. On one side, COPA-COGECA, the umbrella organisation representing European farmers, expressed strong reservations (their position paper is here, and see also their letter to the Council Presidency here). For farmers already facing volatile input costs, drought, and tightening environmental rules, the prospect of further price hikes was alarming. COPA warned that the tariffs would “weaken the competitiveness of EU agriculture” and called for a broader impact assessment before implementation. They also proposed the suspension of MFN tariffs and the elimination of anti-dumping duties on fertiliser imports.
On the other side, Fertilizers Europe, the industry group representing EU-based producers, welcomed the move—but not without qualification. While supporting the Commission’s recognition of unfair competition and strategic vulnerabilities, Fertilizers Europe argued that the 13% starting tariff was too low. The industry group pushed for immediate and robust protection, citing the high cost of natural gas, carbon pricing under the ETS, and the upcoming CBAM obligations as reasons why EU producers face a “structural cost disadvantage.”
The 2025 proposal underscores the growing entanglement between trade, climate, and competitiveness policy in the governance of the EU fertiliser market. While framed primarily as a strategic response to geopolitical risk, the tariffs are increasingly being justified through the lens of green industrial policy—that is, as necessary to level the playing field for European producers as they transition towards green ammonia and other low-carbon technologies.
Moreover, these debates are overlaid by a more fundamental challenge: the need to reduce overall nitrogen loading and nitrogen losses to the environment, given the significant environmental damages they cause. The key governance question is how to pursue these multiple, and sometimes competing, objectives in ways that are perceived as fair and reasonable, without compromising either food security or the economic viability of the farming sector.
Policy levers to reconcile competing objectives in the fertiliser market
Support for green fertiliser production
In the current geopolitical context, restricting and ultimately halting imports from Russia and Belarus is essential to reduce dependence on these countries for fertiliser imports and to undermine Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression in Ukraine. However, it is not just a matter of restricting trade, but also of ensuring the green transition in fertiliser production accelerates. Nitrogen fertiliser production in the EU is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, used in the Haber-Bosch process to produce ammonia—the building block of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers. This results in significant greenhouse gas emissions.
To abate these emissions, the EU has set its sights on green ammonia, produced using hydrogen from renewable electricity rather than natural gas. Several pilot projects are already underway in countries such as Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, often with state support or EU innovation funding. Yet these technologies are still in their infancy, and the cost differential with conventional production remains large.
Fertiliser manufacturers face substantial capital requirements to shift toward greener processes, but the EU’s funding landscape is becoming more supportive. Key mechanisms include:
- EU Innovation Fund: A major source of grants for innovative low-carbon technologies, including hydrogen-related initiatives, spanning production, storage, and utilisation.
- Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI): This scheme allows the Commission to approve State aid for cross-border projects that promote breakthrough innovations in key sectors and technologies. To date, four hydrogen IPCEIs have been approved with up to €19 billion in State aid to crowd in private investment across the hydrogen value chain.
- European Hydrogen Bank: A new financing instrument under the Green Deal Industrial Plan, allocating €3 billion (partly from the Innovation Fund) to bridge the cost gap between fossil-based and renewable hydrogen via competitive auctions. The first auction in early 2024 cleared at €0.40/kg—lower than expected, and promising for fertiliser applications.
Impact on farmers
The same measures that raise costs for EU farmers may also serve as a catalyst for change. Higher fertiliser prices—whether driven by trade restrictions, carbon levies, or global market shifts—create stronger incentives for more efficient fertiliser use, enhanced nutrient recycling, and a shift toward organic or agroecological systems. From this perspective, rising prices could act as a lever to shift farming practices toward sustainability, closing nutrient cycles and reducing pollution.
This sounds like a a win-win, enabling a decarbonised fertiliser industry, more efficient and resilient farming systems, and lower emissions across the board. Possibly – but ensuring a successful transition will require a complex policy mix. EU farmers are struggling with higher production costs, which undermine their competitiveness. For many farmers, particularly in intensive sectors or economically vulnerable regions, a rapid rise in input costs could prove destabilising without adequate support. A poorly managed transition risks widening inequalities, reducing agricultural output, or provoking political backlash—as seen in protests across Europe in recent years.
There will be some opportunity to offset the higher cost of chemical fertiliser by improving nitrogen use efficiency (NUE) on farms, enabling farmers to achieve the same yields with less synthetic nitrogen input. Unfortunately, data on this indicator is scattered and not up to date. The Farm to Fork Strategy set a target to reduce nutrient losses by at least 50% by 2030 (if NUE is 60%, then nutrient losses are 40%). The Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the 2023-2027 CAP includes an Impact Indicator (I.15) for the Gross Nutrient Balance: Potential surplus of nitrogen on agricultural land but the data are not complete or up to date.
The data on Gross Nutrient Balance [aei_pr_gnb] are provided by Eurostat and can be used to calculate NUE. They are currently only available for countries that report while EU estimates are made by Eurostat. However, the EU-wide data are only available up to 2014, when the EU average NUE was 71%. This compares to an estimate of 63% for 2010 derived from a version of the Miterra-Europe model in a Wageningen University Research publication (de Vries et al., 2022, Table 5).
But NUE can vary widely, both across Member States and within different cropping systems. For countries with more recent data up to 2021, the Eurostat data suggest some Member States obtain much lower rates (Spain 57% and Netherlands 55% in 2021, where in NL average applications per hectare are also much higher). In these countries almost half the applied nitrogen is lost to the environment — through leaching, runoff, or volatilisation. In contrast, other Member States achieve higher NUE rates (Germany 78% and France 82% in 2021), thanks to better timing, placement, choice of fertiliser, and crop rotations. These differences suggest that many farms can achieve the same yields with less synthetic nitrogen by improving management practices (note that different NUEs between Member States may also be due to differences in definitions, data and methodologies between countries as underlined by Eurostat).
One of the initiatives in the Commission’s circular economy action plan was the development of an Integrated Nutrient Management Action Plan (INMAP) designed to help achieve the target reduction in nutrient losses of 50% by 2030 set out in the Farm to Fork Strategy. A JRC study on Knowledge for the Integrated Nutrient Management Action Plan (Grizzetti et al., 2023) set out the scientific rationale for the action plan and reviewed potential policy levers. The Commission published a call for evidence in 2022 but to date there has been no follow up and no formal proposal for an action plan has been made.
The Commission had previously proposed, in its 2018 legislative proposal for the CAP 2021-2027, that all EU farmers should have to implement an obligatory nutrient management tool – “Farm Sustainability Tool for Nutrients ( FaST)” – that would contribute to reducing ammonia and nitrous oxide emissions from the agriculture sector. This would be done by introducing a new GAEC 5 requiring use of such a tool as an eligibility condition for direct payments (footnotes in the draft regulation spelled out in detail the functionalities such a tool should have).
Despite support for the idea of a nutrient management tool from Fertilizers Europe, the idea of mandatory obligation was a step too far for both the Council and Parliament. Instead, the proposal was downgraded in recital 51 in the CAP Strategic Plan Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 to a recommendation that information on nutrient management should be provided with the help of an electronic Farm Sustainability Tool by Member States to individual farmers, and that the Commission should be enabled to provide support to Member States in the design of the Tool. Article 15 further lays down that farm advisory services in each Member State should be in a position to advise on the sustainable management of nutrients, including at the latest as from 2024 using a Farm Sustainability Tool. However, the extent to which farmers are making use of such digital tools for nutrient management is unknown (a questionnaire to Member States in November 2023 did not appear to seek such information). These considerations suggest that improvements in NUE are a viable strategy for many farmers to limit their exposure to higher synthetic nitrogen prices.
In the medium to long term, the EU must continue exploring alternatives to synthetic nitrogen, such as organic fertilisers, biostimulants, and soil health strategies. While these solutions currently face scalability and cost challenges, greater investment in R&D and regulatory support could unlock their broader use. For example, introducing legumes into a crop rotation can contribute to soil fertility and reduce synthetic nitrogen use, but may also lead to opportunity costs in terms of reduced yields or economic returns, depending on the specific cropping system and market conditions.
Another avenue is the use of RENURE (Recovered Nitrogen from Manure) fertilisers. These products are derived from animal manure through treatments such as anaerobic digestion, separation, or ammonia stripping, resulting in materials like ammonium salts, digestate fractions, and mineral concentrates. RENURE products behave like mineral fertilisers but originate from livestock manure, meaning they can substitute synthetic nitrogen while supporting nutrient recycling within EU farming systems.
Because RENURE fertilisers are derived from livestock manure, their use is currently restricted by the EU’s Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) which limits nitrogen application from organic sources to 170 kg N/ha/year in designated Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) to prevent water pollution. The Commission proposed a directive in 2024 which would permit a derogation from the Nitrates Directive for their use. Based on the argument that RENURE products, due to their processing, can be treated as similar to mineral fertilisers, the Commission would allow the use of RENURE fertilisers above the amount of 170 kg N per hectare for livestock manure. The justification is to improve substitution of chemical fertilisers by organic fertilisers, reduce costs for farmers and enhance the strategic autonomy of the Union’s agricultural sector.
The proposal has given rise to controversy. The Nitrates Directive does not restrict the use of synthetic nitrogen. The Commission foresees that the RENURE fertilisers would substitute for synthetic fertilisers that would otherwise be applied above the organic limit of 170 kg N/ha/year. Critics argue that, given most Member States are unlikely to reach their water quality targets by 2027, the proposal simply encourages the continued over-application of nitrogen in areas with already-high livestock densities (the Commission proposal contains a ceiling limit on the amount of RENURE fertiliser that may be applied but at a level of 100 kg N/ha/year).
A recent study concludes that this amendment to the Nitrates Directive could contribute to sustainability goals in an economic way, leading to a reduction in GHG emissions by 6% in livestock-dense regions and a saving of 4.8% in economic costs (Vingerhoets et al., 2025). Due to transport costs and the economics of converting livestock manure into processed organic fertiliser, RENURE fertilisers will be relevant mainly in areas in high livestock density. Wrzaszcz and Sobierajewska (2023) argue for this reason they will not be relevant in Poland and many other EU countries, while also highlighting issues around the handling and management of these products.
Presently, the proposal appears to be in a state of limbo. COPA-COGECA supported by the biogas industry has urged the relevant Commissioners to progress the proposal while also removing some of its restrictive features. However, at best RENURE fertilisers would seem to have potential only in limited areas. Their use will also need to be accompanied by stronger measures to address the nitrogen surplus problem from all nitrogen sources in these areas with high livestock densities.
Conclusions
The governance of the EU fertiliser market is shaped by a complex interplay between agricultural competitiveness, industrial policy, and environmental sustainability. Historically, EU trade policy has had to balance the interests of farmers, seeking access to affordable inputs, with those of domestic fertiliser producers facing international competition. This longstanding tension has been intensified by recent geopolitical developments, notably the war in Ukraine, and by the EU’s climate and environmental policy objectives.
The implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the proposed new tariffs on Russian and Belarusian fertilisers reflect a strategic shift towards aligning trade policy with broader climate and security goals. These measures, however, are likely to contribute to higher fertiliser prices, thereby raising production costs for farmers. While this presents immediate challenges, it also corresponds to the type of economic instrument that many economists would advocate —namely, taxing nitrogen use to reflect its environmental externalities. Although, in principle, such a tax should be based on nitrogen losses to the environment rather than on nitrogen inputs, the outcome of higher fertiliser prices can nonetheless serve as a proxy for incentivising more efficient nitrogen use.
Addressing the disruption of the nitrogen cycle, a key planetary boundary that has already been exceeded in Europe, will require a substantial reduction in total nitrogen inputs, regardless of whether they are produced through conventional or low-carbon methods. Simply greening the production process without addressing over-application risks perpetuating water pollution, biodiversity loss, and greenhouse gas emissions.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to support farmers in adjusting to this new environment. Measures to promote improved nitrogen use efficiency (NUE) are critical, helping farmers maintain yields while reducing nitrogen application rates. Greater adoption of practices such as biological nitrogen fixation through the use of legumes, the deployment of biostimulants to enhance nutrient uptake, and the substitution of some chemical fertilisers with RENURE products can all contribute to this transition. Strengthening advisory services, promoting farm sustainability tools for nutrient management, and investing in research and innovation to improve the scalability of alternatives will also be essential.
Ultimately, a successful transition will require coherence across trade, agricultural, and environmental policies. The challenge is to manage the transition in a way that reduces strategic dependencies and environmental harm, supports the decarbonisation of fertiliser production, and enables farmers to adapt without compromising food security or economic viability.
This post was written by Alan Matthews. It was motivated by an invitation to take part in a panel discussion on the AgEnRes research project at the 99th Annual Conference of the UK Agricultural Economics Society earlier this month. This Horizon EU project is intended to help farmers to deal with price fluctuations of fossil energy and mineral fertilisers, to become more independent of these inputs, to increase income and to reduce emissions to the environment. I am grateful to the organisers for the invitation.
Photo credit: Spreading nitrogen fertiliser on winter wheat. © Copyright Adrian S Pye and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence.
O artigo foi publicado originalmente em CAP Reform.